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Using survey data collected in 1995, 2000 and 2005 from US academic economists, in which respondents were 
asked to indicate what percentage of their work time they allocate to research, teaching and service activities, 
and also how their departments and schools weight research, teaching and service in determining annual 
raises and making promotion and tenure decisions, we find these economists were allocating more time to 
teaching even though perceived departmental and school incentives provided a clear premium for research. 
The overall samples did not show major changes in their allocation of time from 1995–2005, but there were 
different responses at different types of schools, with increased time spent on research by faculty at doctoral 
schools while at masters’ and baccalaureate schools more time was devoted to teaching. We use regression 
analysis to investigate factors that affect how different faculty members allocate their time between teaching 
and research. In addition to Carnegie school classifications and related school characteristics, faculty members’ 
gender and rank were significant predictors of how economists allocate their time. Male economists, 
particularly among assistant professors at research universities, spent less time on teaching and more time on 
research than female economists.  
JEL classification: A20, A22 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper we report survey data on time allocation decisions made by US academic economists, and 
investigate factors that explain those allocations. We combine data from national surveys conducted in 
2005 (Watts and Becker, 2008) and in 1995 and 2000 (Becker and Watts, 1996, 2001), which they used to 
identify teaching methods in undergraduate economics courses. Our focus here is on questions from the 
background sections of these surveys, in which respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of 
time they allocated to teaching, research, and service, and the weightings they felt their departments 
assigned to each of these activities for decisions on annual raises and, separately, for promotion and 
tenure decisions.  
The limited research on factors affecting how faculty members allocate time to different activities has 
been noted before (Gautier and Wauthy, 2007; Toutkoushian, 1999). The earlier research almost always 




presumably affect all faculty members in much the same way, or on general problems and issues such as 
the difficulty of accurately measuring output in research, service and especially teaching. A large share of 
this work has been done by economists, who not surprisingly focus on the effects of incentives facing 
faculty. But despite that, the previous studies rarely deal with faculty members from economics or any 
other particular discipline, as we do here – although a few make some comparisons across faculty from 
different disciplines.  
By drawing on the three national surveys of US economists, we are first able to see how well these 
responses match with the responses of faculty members from the cross-discipline surveys that are 
featured in most of the earlier research. But our focus on economists and the factors that are important 
in their time allocation decisions also leads us to consider issues that might have different effects from 
what is or might be seen in most other fields. The most notable such factor is gender, which has been 
shown to play some (relatively modest) role across faculty from all disciplines, but may have more impact 
in economics given the historical under-representation of females in economics – at least in the United 
States – that has been documented both in terms of the shares of undergraduate and graduate degrees 
awarded, and the share of faculty members at different ranks and types of schools.
1 After briefly 
reviewing earlier studies on these topics, we use the three national surveys of US economists to develop 
new findings on these topics and issues. 
2.  Literature review 
Becker (1979) provided an early theoretical model of the expected effects of raising weights assigned to 
research or teaching, given differences in the ability to quantify and agree upon measures of faculty 
performance. Flemming (1991) raised additional questions about measures of research output, and how 
those measures can be subject to different incentive issues and to the mix of pure vs. applied research.  
A 1994 report from the U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) found full-time faculty 
reported working more than 50 hours a week, on average, with more time devoted to research at 
research-intensive institutions. A 1997 NCES study using data from the 1993 National Survey of 
Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF) found that full-time faculty spent, on average, 54% of their time teaching 
and 16% on research, with men spending a higher percentage of time (18% vs. 12%) on research, and a 
lower percentage (55% vs. 62%) on teaching. Using the same NSOFP data, Bellas and Toutkoushian (1999) 
found that after controlling for race, experience, marital status, number of children, age, highest degree, 
rank, field and Carnegie classifications of institutions, women spent only 3% more time teaching than 
men, and 2% less time on research. They also found that men reported working about two hours a week 
more on the job than women, but only about one hour a week after controlling for the same factors 
listed above.  
Also using the NSOPF data, Walstad and Allgood (2005, p. 182) concluded that many economics 
professors at research universities had ‘a low regard for teaching and a high regard for research’ – and 
did not find that to be true for professors in other social sciences, the biological or physical sciences, 
mathematics and statistics, engineering, or business. They found physical and biological scientists were 
closer to economists’ views than respondents from other academic disciplines, ‘but not nearly as extreme 
in the views of the teaching and research tradeoffs as… economics professors’ (pp. 182–3). In a later 
working paper using the NSOPF data, Allgood and Walstad (2006) found a bi-directional but asymmetric 
substitution effect in faculty allocations of time to research or teaching, with a 10% increase in time spent 
                                                 
1 See annual reports of the American Economic Association’s Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics 
Profession, published in the annual May Proceedings volumes of the American Economic Review (or in recent years 
in the supplementary online Proceedings); annual reports on bachelor’s degrees awarded in economics drawn from 
the AEA Universal Academic Questionnaire, published by John Siegfried in the Journal of Economic Education; and 
Ginther and Kahn (2004).  Time Allocations and Reward Structures for US Academic Economists from 1995-2005 
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on research leading to a 1.5% decrease in time spent on teaching, and a 10% increase in time spent on 
teaching reducing time spent on research by 8.5%. 
For a sample of US faculty members from the arts and sciences, Singell, Lillydahl and Singell (1996) found 
that most differences in faculty time allocations were accounted for by structural differences between 
universities with different research orientations. They also found that faculty characteristics reinforced 
the different institutional missions, and concluded that self-selection will condition university policies 
intended to change faculty behaviour – for example in trying to direct more faculty time to teaching at 
research universities. 
Milem, Berger and Dey (2000) found that faculty could devote more time to both teaching and research, 
and that substitutions between teaching and research might be unidirectional, so that spending less time 
on teaching could lead to spending more time on research, but devoting less time to research would not 
lead to spending more time on teaching.  
Becker, Lindsay and Grizzle (2003) argued that many universities require faculty to do both research and 
teaching because stronger students choose to attend universities where faculty are doing more research. 
They report a strong negative relationship between faculty time devoted to teaching and time doing 
research.  
Laband and Tollison (2003) found a substantial increase in the emphasis on research at US and other 
universities from 1974–96, tied to stronger incentives for faculty to increase research output (including 
higher salaries, reduced teaching loads and increased support for travel to conferences). Measured by 
the share of uncited papers, however, which remained constant at 26%, they found no improvement in 
the quality of research published. 
Gautier and Wauthy (2007, p. 274) argued that faculty time allocation across teaching and research is 
‘largely a matter of taste and incentives’ and support university-wide ‘yardsticks’ to allocate research 
funds as a way to improve both teaching and research. Einarson and Clarkberg (2004) found that the time 
faculty report spending with students outside the classroom is not affected by reported faculty work time 
constraints, but is affected by faculty having children and by differences in beliefs about the educational 
role of faculty members.  
Link, Swann and Bozeman (2008) reported that time allocations by science and engineering faculty at top 
US universities are affected by tenure, promotion, and other career path issues, with full professors 
spending more time on service and less time on teaching and research. Long-term associate professors 
spend more time teaching and less time on research. Female faculty members appear to allocate more 
time to service and less time to research. 
3.  Data 
The 1995, 2000 and 2005 mail surveys from which our data are drawn were all five pages long, with few 
changes in items across the different years. In 1995, 2947 economists were selected either as academic 
members of the American Economic Association (AEA) or as college/university teachers of economics 
listed by College Marketing Guide (CMG), a private company that offered mailing lists of US college and 
university instructors. Unfortunately, for the 2000 and 2005 surveys mailing lists of AEA members by 
employee type were no longer available. Instead, in 2000 a sample of 3103 economists was drawn 
entirely from CMG lists. In 2005 the CMG lists were no longer available, so lists of economics instructors 
were purchased from Market Data Retrieval (MDR), a private company that offered mailing lists of 
various groups, including college teachers in different disciplines. The 2005 survey was mailed to 3711 




In all three surveys fixed-interval sampling was used to identify the questionnaire recipients from the 
respective source lists. In 1995 the response rate was 21%, in 2000 it was 19%, and in 2005 it was 13%. 
Results from all three surveys are based on opportunistic samples and self-reported data. There is no way 
of knowing whether respondents are representative of all US teachers of undergraduate economics 
courses, but our intuition is that those with greater interest in teaching were more likely to complete and 
return surveys. Even if this is true, it is not clear that would lead to a predictable bias in responses to the 
questions of interest in this paper. For example, instructors more interested in teaching might be likely to 
report higher percentages of time spent on teaching and higher weights on teaching for annual raise and 
promotion/tenure decisions because they have found positions that reward teaching, either at 
departments and schools that emphasise good teaching or working as teaching specialists in more 
research-oriented departments. On the other hand, they might report higher percentages and weights on 
research if they feel the research demands they face at their schools are excessive. Consequently, we 
have not attempted to adjust for any possible bias resulting from sample selection issues.  
Definitions for variables on faculty members’ personal time allocations and departmental incentives – 
indicating the percentage of time instructors report spending in teaching, research and service, and the 
weightings these same respondents feel their institutions assign to these activities in awarding annual 
raises or promotion and tenure – are reported in Table 1. Mean responses and standard deviations are 
provided for 1995, 2000 and 2005.
2 Percentages do not sum to 100 because some respondents could 
view their time allocation as including activities other than teaching, research and service, including 
administration.
3  
As reported in Harter, Becker and Watts (2004), from 1995 to 2000 economists were allocating more 
time to teaching even though their perceptions of departmental and school incentives (for promotion 
and tenure decisions as well as annual raises) provided a clear premium for research. The disparity in 
time allocation and reward structures continues in the 2005 data. Specifically, for the overall sample we 
see almost no change in faculty time allocations from 2000 to 2005, with US economists spending a little 
over half of their time on teaching, a little over 20% on research, and about 9% on service activities. This 
is very much in line with findings from the NSOPF data for faculty from all departments, reported above.
4  
Other than a slight decrease in the perceived weightings assigned to research, the relative weightings on 
teaching, research and service for promotion and tenure decisions changed very little from 2000 to 2005 
in the overall sample. For annual raises the importance of both teaching and research decreased slightly 
from 2000 to 2005, perhaps reflecting a general funding environment over that period in which most US 
departments and schools were, in practice if not in word, giving across-the-board raises more often than 
differentiating on merit. But in general there was very little change in the structure of incentives from 
2000 to 2005.  
 
                                                 
2 The mean values are slightly lower and the numbers of observations slightly higher here than the basic results 
reported in Watts and Becker (2008) because we are focusing on a sub-section of the survey and made some minor 
adjustments.  Specifically, if a respondent reported percentages for the weights on promotion and tenure decisions 
that totalled 100 but left some entries for those variables blank, it seemed clear the blanks represented a zero so we 
replaced the blanks with zeros.  We did the same for variables on department weights for annual raise decisions and 
faculty time allocation percentages.  For some variables this increased the number of observations and lowered 
mean values. 
3 Tables of  z-statistics for differences in the mean values reported in Tables 1 and 2, across the three survey periods, 
are available on request.  We make no attempt to draw statistical inferences because of the nature of the survey 
data.  
4 Guest and Duhs (2002) provide survey evidence for economists in Australia, and conclude that rewards for teaching 
are too low in Australian schools to promote better student ratings of teaching.  They also note the limited use of 
teaching methods that engage students in learning. 
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Table 1 Variable definitions and mean values 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
  1995  2000  2005 
Variable definition  n  Mean  n  Mean  n  Mean 
Proteach – weight in percentage that 
teaching has in school decisions about 
promotion and tenure 
556  44.13 
(25.95) 
534  49.00 
(24.31) 
401  49.85 
(22.59) 
Proresearch – weight in percentage that 
research has in school decisions about 
promotion and tenure 
557  43.68 
(27.90) 
531  37.52 
(25.74) 
400  35.42 
(24.06) 
Proservice – weight in percentage that 
service has in school decisions about 
promotion and tenure 
555  11.94 
(9.77) 
529  13.15 
(10.34) 
401  13.89 
(9.89) 
Annteach – weight in percentage that 
teaching has in school decisions about 
annual raises 
478  37.53 
(27.32) 
420  41.02 
(26.71) 
297  38.09 
(26.18) 
Annresearch – weight in percentage that 
research has in school decisions about 
annual raises 
480  40.49 
(28.57) 
415  36.86 
(26.48) 
295  35.84 
(27.47) 
Annservice – weight in percentage that 
service has in school decisions about annual 
raises 
478  12.19 
(12.75) 
414  12.36 
(11.28) 
295  13.16 
(12.10) 
Teach – percentage of work time devoted 
to teaching 
588  51.96 
(22.96) 
567  55.85 
(21.92) 
455  56.45 
(23.60) 
Research – percentage of work time 
devoted to research 
587  29.54 
(22.06) 
564  22.82 
(18.88) 
450  22.52 
(20.77) 
Service – percentage of work time devoted 
to service activities 
na  na  562  9.09 
(8.57) 
451  9.32 
(8.95) 
 
There are several possible explanations for the disproportionate amount of time spent teaching, 
compared to the reward structures for teaching and research. Teaching loads and large class sizes in 
economics courses (both in absolute terms, and compared to class sizes in other disciplines) may require 
more time than the mix reflected in departmental or school incentives; or additional time spent on 
research may not reliably lead to more publications, and so have a lower expected return than additional 
time spent on teaching; or as a matter of tastes economics faculty at most schools may prefer to spend 
more time teaching than doing research.  
The 1995 and 2000 data showed interesting differences in time allocation and incentive structures for 




2005, in Table 2 we break down the time allocation (part A) and incentive results (part B) across different 
types of institutions using three Carnegie classifications – bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral institutions. 
There were insufficient responses from associate-degree-granting institutions in the 2005 survey to 
include that as a fourth group.  
Table 2 Means of percentages of faculty time allocations and departmental incentives by 
Carnegie Classification of Institution (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 




1995 values  2000 values  2005 values 
Baccalaureate Institutions 
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1995 values  2000 values  2005 values 
Baccalaureate Institutions 






















































Masters Institutions  





























































1995 values  2000 values  2005 values 
Doctoral Institutions  























































We find only small changes in time allocations in 2005 for any of the different types of schools, but the 
direction of changes are different at different types of schools. At bachelor’s and master’s institutions 
there is a small increase in time devoted to teaching, and at bachelor’s institutions there is a small 
decrease in time devoted to research. Conversely, at doctoral institutions we see a small decrease in time 
spent on teaching and a small increase in time spent on research. This probably signals that faculty at the 
different types of schools are being held to different kinds of performance standards. 
That is supported by comparing changes in incentives structures from 2000 to 2005, when there is a 
decrease in the weightings for both teaching and research in determining annual raises at bachelor’s 
institutions and an increase in the importance of teaching for both promotion/tenure decisions and 
annual raises at master’s universities. Conversely, at doctoral institutions the relative weighting for 
teaching declined while the importance of research increased. Although faculty at the doctoral schools 
still continue to report spending nearly half of their time on teaching – and considerably more time than 
the perceived weights for teaching in departmental and school incentive structures – over time the 
faculty at these schools do seem to be responding to a rising premium on research. Those internal 
incentives from departments are no doubt reinforced by a growing difference in compensation levels for 
economists at doctoral/research schools, compared to other schools with more of a teaching mission, as 
reported annually in the May American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings volume.  Time Allocations and Reward Structures for US Academic Economists from 1995-2005 
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4.  Determinants of time allocations 
To investigate the determinants of time allocations reported by academic economists, we report results 
from ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent variables are the percentages of time 
allocated to either teaching or research. Independent variables include both individual respondent 
characteristics – gender, rank, whether or not the respondent speaks English as a first language, and 
membership in the American Economic Association (AEA) – and institutional characteristics such as the 
Carnegie classification for respondents’ schools, the average size of principles classes and average 
teaching loads for faculty in the respondents’ departments, and weightings assigned to teaching and  
 
Table 3: Additional variable definitions and mean values for combined (1995, 2000 and 2005) 
responses (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Variable name  N  Mean 
Assoc – dummy variable = 1 for schools with Carnegie 
classification of Associate 
1696  0.10 
(0.30) 
Bacc – dummy variable = 1 for schools with Carnegie 
classification of Baccalaureate 
1696  0.19 
(0.40) 
Masters – dummy variable = 1 for schools with Carnegie 
classification of Masters 
1696  0.29 
(0.46) 
Male – dummy variable = 1 for males  1663  0.80 
(0.40) 
Instructor – dummy variable = 1 for faculty with rank of 
Instructor or Lecturer 
1636  0.09 
(0.29) 
Asst – dummy variable = 1 for faculty with rank of Assistant 
Professor  
1636  0.20 
(0.40) 
Assoc – dummy variable = 1 for faculty with rank of Associate 
Professor  
1636  0.27 
(0.45) 
Other Rank – dummy variable = 1 for teaching assistants, adjunct 
professors, emeritus professors, or other miscellaneous ranks 
1636  0.03 
(0.16) 
English1 – dummy variable = 1 for faculty who speak English as 
their first language 
1663  0.89 
(0.31) 
Class Size – average size of principles classes in the respondent’s 
department 
1382  66.34 
(90.10) 
SemLoad – the average semester teaching load for tenure and 
tenured-track faculty in the respondent’s department  
1444  3.10 
(1.05) 
1995 Dummy – dummy variable = 1 for responses from the 1995 
survey 
1696  0.37 
(0.48) 
2000 Dummy – dummy variable = 1 for responses from the 2000 
survey 
1696  0.35 
(0.48) 
AEA Member – dummy variable = 1 for respondents who report 
that they are AEA members 
1635  0.64 




research activities for promotion and tenure decisions. We also included dummy variables to indicate the 
year for each survey response – 1995, 2000 or 2005 (the omitted category).
5  
In Table 3 above we report descriptive statistics for the additional variables included in the OLS 
regressions, based on data from all three surveys. Most respondents are male and speak English as their 
first language. The largest number of respondents – but not a majority – taught at doctoral institutions. 
As expected, the variables for Carnegie classification were highly correlated with other variables 
measuring institutional characteristics, such as average class size in principles courses and weightings for 
teaching and research activities in the respondents’ promotion and tenure or annual raise decisions.
6 
Therefore, to test whether the Carnegie classifications had the expected effects on time allocations for 
teaching and research, we first used OLS to regress only the Carnegie classification variables on our 
dependent variables. We report these results combining all three survey datasets in Tables 4A (using 
percentage of time spent on teaching as the dependent variable) and 4B (using percentage of time spent 
on research as the dependent variable). The omitted comparison groups are the Carnegie Doctoral and 
Research classifications – the separate Carnegie classification for Research schools was dropped before 
the 2005 survey was conducted, so for 1995 and 2000 we combined the Doctoral and Research 
classifications. It is clear that respondents from the Research and Doctoral institutions spend more time 
on research and less time on teaching than respondents at schools with the other classifications. 
Table 4A: OLS regression for Carnegie Classifications: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching 
Carnegie Classification  Coefficient  p value 
ASSOCIATE  31.718  0.000 
BACCALAUREATE  12.588  0.000 
MASTERS  12.782  0.000 
Constant  38.035  0.000 
n = 1609 
adjusted R-squared = 0.17 
                                                 
5 The reports by Becker and Watts cited above, reporting responses on teaching and assessment methods from 
these three surveys, were remarkably consistent over the three survey periods; but of course that does not mean 
that how faculty members allocated their time across teaching and research, or their perceptions of how their 
schools and departments were rewarding teaching and research over this 15-year period, would also be so uniform.  
To test that we estimated the equations reported below in Tables 5–7 (except that initially we did not include the 
AEA membership variable) for each of the survey years.  We then compared the estimated equations using F tests.  
The null hypothesis of no difference between the pairs of estimates for different years was rejected for all equations 
with time spent on teaching as the dependent variable.  It was nearly rejected for the research equations for 1995 
and 2000 (p = 0.07) and 1995 and 2005 (p= 0.09), but not rejected for 2000 and 2005.  Because an AEA mailing list 
was used to draw most of the 1995 sample but not the 2000 and 2005 samples, as noted above, we added the AEA 
membership variable and re-estimated the annual equations and F tests, feeling that membership in AEA was likely 
to signal more interest in research activities.  Although that lowered some of the F values the same results persisted 
for the teaching equations, and the null hypothesis was still rejected in the research equations for 1995 and 2005.  
Therefore, in the final estimates reported here, we add binary variables to indicate the year in which the survey 
results were provided and include the AEA membership variable. 
6 Many of the simple correlation coefficients with the school classifications were higher than 0.5 (for absolute 
values), including teaching loads and weightings for teaching and research in promotion and annual raise decisions. 
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Table 4B: OLS regression for Carnegie Classifications: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research 
Carnegie Classification  Coefficient  p value 
Associate  –29.824  0.000 
Baccalaureate  –13.832  0.000 
Masters  –13.917  0.000 
Constant  35.086  0.000 
n = 1599 
adjusted R-squared = 0.20 
 
As a robustness test, and because of the change in the Carnegie classifications before the 2005 survey, 
we also ran regressions for each of the three survey data sets individually, and with the combined data 
sets for 1995 and 2000. Those results are not reported here but are available on request. The results 
were quite stable, with signs for all variables unchanged in all of the regressions.  
In Tables 5A and 5B we replace the variables for Carnegie classifications with variables for instructors’ 
personal characteristics and the institutional variables such as class size, semester teaching load, and 
rewards for teaching and research that were correlated with the Carnegie classifications.
7 The first 
column of results includes observations from faculty at all schools, regardless of the Carnegie 
classification of the school. The next four columns show results for faculty at each of the four Carnegie 
Classifications (again combining the Doctoral and Research classifications, which had been merged by 
2005). 
For the set of academic rank variables, our omitted category was full professors and endowed chairs. We 
include an ‘Other Rank’ variable here to identify teaching assistants, adjunct professors and a few others 
who do not fit traditional rank categories for regular faculty. Not surprisingly, except for the ‘Other Rank’ 
group and at the Associate Schools where teaching loads for all faculty members are very high, we find 
that most respondents spend more time on teaching than the full professors and endowed chairholders, 
who normally have more experience in teaching their courses. But those differences are only significant 
for the instructor/lecturer group (and even there not in the Associate schools), and for the Other Rank 
group at the Doctoral and Research Schools. Instructors and associate professors spend less time on 
research than full professors, but assistant professors reported spending more time on research (except 
at the Associate schools). That coefficient is significant for the overall sample and at Doctoral/Research 




                                                 
7 We lose 300–400 observations by including the class size and semester load variables in the regressions.  In an 
attempt to avoid losing these observations we tried using indicator variables when mean values for these variables 
were inserted for the missing values.  This worked reasonably well for the Semester Load variable but not for the 
Class Size variable, which exhibited considerably more variation.  Using the indicator variables for just Semester Load 
saved only 127 observations and did not affect signs for other variables, so we dropped all use of the indicator 




Table 5A OLS regression for individual and school variables: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching 




































































































































































n  1104  115  253  387  349 
ADJUSTED R-
SQUARED 
0.31  0.22  0.25  0.18  0.27 
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Table 5B  OLS regression for individual and school variables: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research 




































































































































































n  1097  113  251  384  349 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.42  0.24  0.38  0.35  0.34 





Faculty members who spoke English as their first language generally spent significantly less time on 
research than non-native English speakers. This may be because the native-English speakers were more 
likely to be at schools that put more emphasis on teaching, while the non-native English speakers were 
more likely to be at schools that placed a higher value on research. Using a chi-squared test, we found a 
statistically significant difference in the distribution of native English speakers versus non-native English 
speakers across the different Carnegie classifications of schools. Specifically, there were fewer non-native 
speakers at Associate and Baccalaureate schools.  
The signs on the variables for departmental weightings of teaching and research activities in promotion 
and tenure (P&T) decisions – as perceived by respondents – have the expected signs and the coefficients 
are significant. The same is true for variables on class size in principles courses and faculty semester 
teaching loads: at schools where principles classes are smaller and faculty members teach more courses, 
respondents report spending more time teaching and less time doing research – although these results 
are not always significant for the ranges of class sizes and teaching loads reported within a particular 
Carnegie group of schools.  
The dummy variables indicating which annual survey a respondent completed are only significant in the 
teaching equation for the Doctoral/Research schools, and in the research equation for the overall sample 
only for the 1995 survey only at the 0.10 level. As noted above, the 1995 sample was the only group 
drawn largely from an AEA mailing list, and the AEA membership variable does indicate that economists 
who are AEA members report spending significantly more time on research and less time on teaching. 
Noting that there are both gender and rank effects on how academic economists allocate their time, we 
used interaction terms to investigate whether women and men at different ranks allocate their time 
differently. First we looked at the effects of gender and gender*rank interaction terms, while dropping 
the individual rank variables, to explore the effect gender may have on time allocations if women have 
different career paths and timelines across academic ranks, compared to males. Then we dropped the 
individual gender variable and used the different rank variables with the set of rank*gender interaction 
terms, to investigate the effect of rank if the distribution of male and female faculty members across 
ranks is different. In both sets of estimations using interactive terms we drop the Other Rank respondents 
who were included in Table 5, to focus on respondents in regular faculty positions (i.e. ranks of 
Instructor/Lecturer, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor or Full Professor/Endowed Chairs).  
As reported in Table 6A, investigating whether gender makes a difference in how time is allocated to 
teaching and research by faculty members with different ranks, we find that although males spend less 
time teaching there are statistically significantly positive interaction effects for males who are instructors. 
For the results from all types of schools, using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on 
MALE, MALE*INSTRUCTOR, MALE*ASSISTANTPROF, and MALE*ASSOCPROF are all zeroes, we find an F 
value of 6.72 (with four degrees of freedom and 1069 observations) with a p value of 0.000. Therefore, 
we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a difference between males and females. In the 
estimations for different types of Carnegie schools, we reject the null hypothesis at Baccalaureate and 
Doctoral/Research schools (with p values of 0.00) but not for Associate and Masters’ schools (with p 
values of 0.73 and 0.13, respectively). 
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Table 6A OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender and career paths: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching 
























































































































































n  1081  106  247  386  342 
Adjusted R-squared  0.31  0.23  0.27  0.18  0.27 
 
We also investigated the gender and rank interactions using the percentage of time spent on Research as 
the dependent variable. As reported in Table 6B, we found there are statistically significant negative 
interaction effects for males who are instructors and positive interaction effects for males who are 
assistant professors. Once again using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on MALE, 
MALE*INSTRUCTOR, MALE*ASSISTANTPROF, and MALE*ASSOCPROF are all zeroes, for the results from 




with a p value of 0.000 and again reject the null hypothesis of no difference between males and females. 
In the estimations for different types of Carnegie schools, we reject the null hypothesis at Master’s and 
Doctoral/Research schools (with p values of 0.01 and 0.00 respectively), but not for Associate and 
Baccalaureate schools (with p values of 0.42 and 0.49, respectively). 
 
Table 6B OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender and career paths: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research 


























































































































































n  1074  104  245  383  342 
Adjusted R-squared  0.42  0.22  0.37  0.36  0.36 
 
Finally, as reported in Tables 7A and 7B, we investigate the possible effect of rank that might be related 
to differences in the distribution of men and women across different ranks. We found that all of the ranks 
listed in the table spend more time teaching than the omitted category of full professors and endowed 
chairs, except for Instructors and Assistant Professors at Associate Schools, where teaching loads for all Time Allocations and Reward Structures for US Academic Economists from 1995-2005 
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faculty members are very high. In the results for all schools we find statistically significant negative 
interaction effects for male assistant professors. Using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that  therefore 
reject the null hypothesis to conclude that rank and gender interact. In the estimations for different types 
of Carnegie schools we reject the null hypothesis for Baccalaureate and Doctoral/Research schools (with 
p values of 0.00), but not for Associate and Master’s schools (with p values of 0.43 and 0.07, 
respectively). 
Table 7A OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender distribution across rank: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching 


















































































































































































n  1081  106  247  386  342 
Adjusted R-squared  0.32  0.25  0.27  0.18  0.27 




Table 7B OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender distribution across rank: 
Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research 


















































































































































































n  1074  104  245  383  342 
Adjusted R-squared  0.42  0.22  0.38  0.35  0.36 
 
Looking at the same question but using the percentage of time spent on Research as the dependent 
variable, with results reported in Table 7B, we found significantly positive interaction effects for male 
assistant professors. In the results for all schools, using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the rank variables and all of the gender and rank interaction terms are zeroes, we find an 
F value of 7.46 (for six degrees of freedom and 1060 observations), with a p value of 0.000, and reject the Time Allocations and Reward Structures for US Academic Economists from 1995-2005 
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null hypothesis that rank and gender do not interact. In the estimations for different types of Carnegie 
schools we reject the null hypothesis for Master’s and Doctoral/Research schools (with p values of 0.03, 
and 0.00, respectively), but not for Associate and Baccalaureate schools (with p values of 0.40 and 0.16, 
respectively). 
Taken together, these results suggest that male and female faculty members behave differently, 
particularly at the rank of assistant professor, with males reporting that they spend more time doing 
research than females. The typical ages for assistant professors are the same ages at which it is most 
common for families to have young children, so female faculty members are perhaps spending more time 
in child bearing, child care, and other household production activities. They might also be working at 
different kinds of schools, either due to their own preferences and self-selection of jobs or because of 
differences in the job offers they receive. We compared the gender distribution across Carnegie 
classifications using a Chi-squared test and fail to reject the null hypothesis whether the Research and 
Doctoral classifications are combined or not. Specifically, combining the classifications we find 
2
3 = 2.44 
with a p value of 0.487, and not combining the classifications we find 
2
4 = 7.47 with a p value of 0.113.   
5.  Conclusions, policy implications, and some speculations 
Although we noted some periods in which departmental incentives for teaching versus research exhibited 
modest changes, in general across all types of schools the incentive structures and faculty behaviours are 
more notable for stability than for change. However, there are important and persistent differences in 
incentives and behaviours across different types of schools – measured here using Carnegie 
classifications – and for faculty members with different personal characteristics, including gender and 
academic rank. 
Salary differentials for US economists at research versus teaching institutions have increased sharply over 
the past decade, as reflected in annual reports that appear in the American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings. Adding that observation to our findings from these survey data raises and highlights an 
interesting and provocative question: are we witnessing an increasingly sharp demarcation between ‘two 
nations’ of economics departments, based on which departments have faculty who regularly publish in 
established economics journals and which do not? Economists at different kinds of schools appear to 
perceive these kinds of differences in the incentive structures they face, and allocate their time in 
different ways in response to those incentives. But at the same time, at all kinds of schools academic 
economists report devoting a disproportionate amount of time to teaching, compared to their 
perceptions of how teaching and research are rewarded at their schools. 
The finding that rank affects how economists at different points in their academic careers allocate time to 
teaching and research activities is not surprising or necessarily troubling. But considered together with 
the apparent differences in career patterns or choices for male and female economists, which affect the 
distribution of time to teaching and research activities, this may represent an important issue that 
deserves more investigation and discussion. The gender finding is in some ways the most interesting and 
challenging issue to face and interpret. But the truth is earlier research in economic education has not 
been able to provide conclusive answers on why females are less likely to major in economics than males 
at the undergraduate level (at least in the United States), or to go on to graduate school and faculty 
positions at all kinds of schools. Some of the possible answers that have been suggested for these 
outcomes, such as gender role-model effects from female faculty to female students, have been heavily 
discounted or at least not well or consistently supported.  
Similarly, at a very general level it could be suggested that positions in research/doctoral schools require 
greater time commitments to succeed and remain current with research skills and knowledge, and entail 
more risk in receiving tenure and salary increases. That could lead many female economists who want to 




might find teaching relatively more rewarding than males, on average. But it is also possible that 
predominantly male faculty in large, research departments engage in (statistical) discrimination against 
females in hiring or promotion decisions. Our findings cannot confirm or refute any of these possible 
explanations.  
Moreover, considering the gender issue across academic fields and at other age levels further 
complicates things. For example, there are technical fields (notably science and medicine) that women 
today pursue far more than they did in the past, and at much higher levels than we see in economics. And 
the attitudes and experiences female students have at the precollege level are almost certainly important 
in shaping their choice of majors in general, and their early decision not to major in economics in 
particular. At the precollege level, gender differences are already widely observed in economics 
assessments, and perceptions (including peer perceptions) of economics as a difficult and somewhat 
technical subject probably discourage some women from taking courses or majoring in economics. But 
there must be other forces at play, too, because again we do see many women are majoring in other 
technical and difficult subjects, perhaps because they find the kind of work done in those areas more 
rewarding or interesting, or because those fields are perceived as being more welcoming and open to 
female students and young professionals. Those kinds of questions will probably have to be addressed in 
studies of precollege students, rather than studies of current faculty members. Our findings suggest that 
it is important for that kind of work to be done, because there are differences in how male and female 
faculty members in economics departments choose to do their jobs, and those differences may well be 
larger and more difficult to change than in other fields. 
Note: We thank Ross Guest and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of 
this paper.  
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